Arthur A. Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher And Associates, A Utah Corporation, And Harold K. Beecher, An Individual : Brief of Amici Curiae by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1969
Arthur A. Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher And
Associates, A Utah Corporation, And Harold K.
Beecher, An Individual : Brief of Amici Curiae
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Allan Mecham; Amici Curiae
This Brief of Amicus Curiae is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Nauman v. Beecher, No. 10609 (Utah Supreme Court, 1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/46
-IN THE SUPREME COUR.T ,·: ~;;:· 
OF THE ST ATE OF UTA·~;:-~~;jt(~~ 
. ~·~i~.~,~ 
ARTHUR A. NAUMAN, 
PZawiff am,iJ, .AppeUMt, 
-vs.-
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah Corporar 
ti.on, and HAROLD K. BEECHER,_ 
an Individual. 





" . ./.. 
. ,;-~: .-::"' 
Brief of Amici Curiae,~--· · 
. ~t 
the Utah Chap~~-,;_ 
American Institute of .· F 
. "', .. l 
I '- E D JUL 1 8 1969 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND 
REASON FOR INTERCESSION -------------------- 2 
THE ARCHITECTS HEREIN HAD NO 
DUTY TO PRESCRIBE OR TO INTER-
FERE WITH THE CONTRACTOR'S 
.METHODS OF DOING HIS WORK ------------ 3 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------- 11 
THE ARCHITECTS HEREIN ARE NOT 
LIABLE AS THIRD PARTIES WITH-
IN THE MEANING OF WORKMEN 
COMPENSATION LAWS ---------------------------------- 12 
CONCLUSION---------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Clinton v. Boehm, 124 N.Y.S. 789, 
139 App. Div. 73 ---------------------------------------------------- 7 
Cook v. Peter Kiewit Construction Company, 
15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P2d 616 ---------------------------------- 13 
Day v. U.S. Radiator Corporation, 
241 La. 288, 128 So 2d 660 ---------------------------------- 7 
Erhart v. Hammonds, 232 Ark. 133, 334 S.W. 869 ---- 8 
Garden City Floral Co. v. Hunt, 
126 Mont. 537, 255 P. 2d 352 ------------------------ 7, 10, 11 
Miller v. De Witt, 37 Ill. 2d, 273, 
226 N.E. 2d 630 ---------------------------------------------- 10, 11, 12 
J\Iontijo vs. Swift, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 -------------------------- 7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX (Continued) 
Page 
Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Associates, 
19 Utah 2d 101, 426 P2d 621 ------------------------------ 3 
Paxton v. Alameda County, 119 Cal. 2d 393, 
259 P2d 934 -------------------------------------------------------------- 9 
TEXT CITED 
Standards of Profession Practice: 
'' 1, 3 an Architect shall not engage in 
building contracting." (1964) ---------------------------- 4 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 25-1-62 ---------- 12 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR A. NAUMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND 
ASSOCIATES, a Utah Corpora-
tio11, and HAROLD K. BEECHER, 
an Individual. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10609 
Brief of Amici Curiae 
l\IA Y IT PLEASE THE COURT: 
The Amici file this brief on permission of the Court 
granted, pursuant to Amici 's petition, and order of the 
Court. Amici represent the Utah Chapter of the Ameri-
can Institute of Architects. 
The American Institute of Architects is a corpora-
tion organized and existing under the laws of the State 
of New York with its principal administrative and exec-
utive offices in Washington, D.C. The Institute is a 
profossional organization of over twenty thousand nine 
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hundred and seventy eight (20,978) corporate members, 
all of whom are registered architects. The Associatio11 
has been in existence for over a century, and its mem-
bership includes a majority of the architects registered 
to practice that profession in the United States. There 
are 155 Chapters in the 50 states of the Union. 
The Utah Chapter was founded in 1921 and cur-
rently has 267 members. More than 90% of all resident 
registered architects practicing in the State of Utah are> 
members of the Utah Chapter of the American Institute 
of Architects. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND REASON 
FOR INTERCESSION 
The plaintiff in this case claims damages against 
Harold K. Beecher and Associates, Inc., an architectural 
firm, for personal injuries which he received from the 
cave-in of an excavation. The plaintiff was employed 
by Christiansen Brothers, Inc., the prime contractor, 
which entered into a contract with Salt Lake County and 
Salt Lake City for the construction of a City-County 
complex. 
The defendant architects were employed under con-
tract by Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City to prepare 
plans and specifications in connection ·with the construc-
tion. The form of the contract between the joint author-
ity and the architects is similar to such architectural 
contracts in use throughout the country during 1960 
when the defendant architects entered into their agree-
ment with the joint authority. 
2 
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After hearing the architects' motion to dismiss, the 
District Court ruled that plaintiff's complaint failed to 
state a claim against them. This Court in Nauman v. 
Harokl K. Beecher & Associates, 19 Utah 2d 101, 426 
P2cl G21 ( 1967), in reversing the lower court's decision 
ht'!d that Xauman's secornl amended complaint stated 
a claim against the defendant architects. Through dicta, 
tl1is Court indicated that if the architects knew or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known the exca-
vation was unsafe, the plaintiff had the right and the 
eonesponcling duty to stop the work. Judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff was granted by the District Court after 
hPariug the case de novo. 
The decision of this Court and the District Court in 
this cause vitally affects the interests of all architects 
who perform services pursuant to such contracts. Since 
it represents a majority of the architects in the State 
of Utah, the Utah Chapter of the American Institute of 
Architects has sought lea,·e to intervene amici curiae to 
present certain points and authorities. 
THE ARCHITECTS HEREIN HAD NO DUTY TO 
PRESCRIBE OR TO INTERFERE -WITH THE 
CONTRACTOR'S METHODS OF DOING 
HIS WORK. 
The architect, by contract and by custom, has a def-
inite function and specific role in connection with the 
planning and drawing of specifications for structures. 
He is, however, not the contractor and, in fact, the pro-
3 
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f essional standards adopted by and enforced by the 
American Institute of Architects prohibit him from en-
gaging in building contracting. 1 
The instant decision appears to controvert the nor-
mal function of the architect in designing and planning 
structures into a kind of super safety-engineer who guar-
antees the safety and well being of all persons employed 
on the project. He is not, and cannot be such a creature 
for a multitude of practical and economic reasons. It is 
respectfully submitted that the subject decision strays 
from established law with respect to the role of an archi-
tect in the designing and planning of structures and 
places upon him a responsibility which is not contem-
plated by the architect's professional status, by his con-
tract with his employer, or by the laws of Utah and other 
states which have considered the matter. 
The construction industry in Utah like the industry 
generally throughout the 50 states is founded upon a 
system of competitive bidding. The usual practice, calls 
for an architect to prepare plans and specifications, on 
the basis of which bids are invited and received from con-
tractors. Bids, most often are sought and obtained from 
a substantial number of contractors to insure that the 
lowest possible bid is obtained. These contractors, gen-
erally speaking, have little flexibility in labor aml ma-
terial bid cost items. What breathes life into the system 
of competitive bidding is the variety of approaches and 
construction methods employed by contractors as deter-
1 Standards of Profession Practice: "I, 3 an Architect shall not engage in 
building contracting." (1964) 
4 
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mined by their equipment, personnel, experience, inge-
nuity and creativity in the use of such equipment and 
personnel. It can be seen that the feasibility of doing 
the work at the bid price depends in large measure upon 
the contractor's methods. His methods are crucial to 
tlw entire system. If the owner or the architect were to 
attempt either to prescribe the methods to be used, or to 
interfere with the contractor after he had begun to pro-
ceed using his methods, the system of competitive bid-
ding would break down and the construction of buildings 
would be engulfed in a circus-like series of architect-
owner-contractor orders and counter-orders. Utter chaos 
would reign supreme if the contractor gave an order to 
use certain equipment, personnel and know-how, and his 
order was countermanded by the architect to use another 
method of performing the work requiring different 
equipment, skill, technique and judgment. 
The objective of the industry is to erect buildings 
properly and safely. The contractural relationships 
which are customarily established and which were pres-
ent here leave the contractor free to do his work as he 
sees fit and as he had agreed to do. The architect has a 
duty to see that the structure which results conforms to 
contract documents, but he is not a super-contractor and 
he is not a safety-engineer on the project. Nor is there 
any evidence that casting the architect in such a role 
would reduce the hazards which attend construction. 
In European countries, no distinction of function is 
drawn in the construction community between architect 
and contractor. The individual who plans and designs a 
5 
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building is the individual who actually builds it. How-
ever, there is no evidence to indicate that construction 
per man hour worked in Europe is any safer than in this 
country, even though the responsibility for all phases of 
a given project are centered in one or an association of 
individuals. 
In the construction community in this country the 
contractor is not answerable to the architect for the 
safety of the project. The architect is not, at least with 
respect to the methods of doing the work, intended to 
function as a protector of the contractor's employees. 
(In many instances, this would mean that the architect 
would be required to follow up, check, and correct, the 
work of the very persons whose own negligence brought 
about their injuries.) 
If the architect is required to be informed about and 
correct the methods of doing the work employed by the 
contractor, it would mean that every structure would 
have to be subject to the architect's review. If this were 
done, it must be done on every structure - the thousands 
which are erected without incident as well as the occa-
sional ones where accidents occur. Such a burden upon 
architects, it is submitted, will destroy the huge construc-
tion industry in this country which has functioned well 
without the imposition of liability upon the architect, 
and any supposed safety advantage will be dispropor-
tionate to the havoc visited upon the system. The cou-
f usion which such a pattern of "checks-and-balances" 
would cause among contractor, architect, and owner, 
would almost inevitably precipitate more accidents than 
6 
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it would prevent. That the architect, by contract and 
custom is not a super safety-engineer on a project, is 
manifest by the general rule that the duty to "supervise 
the work" creates a duty merely to see that the structure 
during construction and upon completion, complies with 
the plans and specifications. Garden City Floral Co. v. 
Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 255 P 2d 352; Day v. U.S. Radiator 
Corporation, 241 La. 288, 128 So 2d 660; Clinton v. 
Boehm, 124 N.Y.S. 789, 139 App. Div. 73. 
Our research has not revealed a single case in the 
area, which contravenes the general rule by holding that 
an architect's "duty to supervise" imposes a corre-
sponding duty to prescribe, and if needs be, interfere 
with the contractor's methods of doing the work in order 
to insure safety of operation. Under scrutiny, the cases 
often cited as supportive of the proposition that the 
''duty to supervise'' broadens the architect's horizon of 
liability, reveal themselves to be in harmony with the 
time-honored line of demarcation which renders an archi-
tect liable for the negligent preparation of plans and 
specifications, and for negligent failure to demand strict 
compliance with plans and specifications, but not for 
failure to prescribe the contractor's mode of operation. 
The cases too, are distinguishable on their facts from the 
case at bar. 
Montijo v. Swift 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963) involved 
an error in the planning and design of the ultimate struc-
ture in that the handrail ended short of the bottom step 
' 
and the visual illustration created by the wall tile caused 
the plaintiff to mistake the last step for the bottom plat-
7 
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form. This case has nothing to do with the problem here 
presented (whether an architect is liable for injury re-
sulting from unsafe construction methods employed by 
the contractor), because the architect there was negligent 
in the preparation of the plans and specifications which 
proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. 
Erhart v. Hammonds 232 Ark. 133, 334 S. W. 869 is 
factually dissimilar to the case for decision for the rea-
son that the defendant architects had by contract ac-
cepted complete responsibility for the supervision of 
construction, a responsibility which Harold K. Beecher 
& Associates, at no time undertook. 
The most salient features of the Erhart case are that 
the architects requested and received $12,000.00, as an 
additional fee over and above their architectural fee, for 
supervision, and that the plans and specifications with 
respect to the shoring of the deep excavation were pre-
pared in great detail by the architects. The architect'B 
field supervisor drove his car up close to the excavation 
just as the rain-soaked excavation "·alls collapsed. Cer-
tainly, under those circumstances the architects had ac-
tively participated in the very methods of construction 
which were the subject of the lawsuit. Moreover, as the 
dissenting opinion makes clear, the liability of the archi-
tects was predicated substantially (if not entirely) upon 
the driving of the automobile up to the edge of the 
excavation. 
In the Nauman case there was no special agreement 
supported by additional consideration to supervise the 
work, there were no specifications detailing the shoring 
8 
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operations to be employed by the contractor other than 
that he was to comply with all state and city safety regu-
lations. As is customary, the manner and method of 
excavation were left entirely up to the contractor. 
Likewise, Paxton v. Alameda County, 119 Cal. 2d 
393, 259 P2d 934 is factually at odds with the case before 
the Court. There it was pleaded that the architect's 
plans and specifications were defective in that they pro-
vided for sheathing of insufficient strength to support 
workman. The architect was exhonerated when it was 
made to appear that the sheathing specifications were 
adequate in every detail. The county was held liable for 
the reason that its agents, the architects with knowledge, 
allowed inferior sheathing to be installed. The pleadings 
in the case had not charged the architects with failure 
to adequately supervise and enforce the plans and speci-
fications. But even if the pleadings had so charged, the 
case would not be precedent for the proposition that a 
duty to supervise the work requires the architect to 
supervise, and if needs be, prescribe for the contractor 
the actual methods for doing the work. The learning 
from the case is merely that an architect is liable for 
negligence in failing to require strict compliance with 
the plans and specifications by the contractor. 
It can be seen that the Montijo, Erhart and Paxton 
eases were all decided along traditional lines of author-
ity. They all hold that an architect is only liable for 
negligent failure to require strict compliance with plans 
and specifications and/or for negligence in the actual 
preparation of plans and specifications. 
9 
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Perhaps the most recent and celebrated case in the 
area of architect liability is that of Miller v. DeWitt, 37 
Ill 2d 273, 226 N.E. 2d 630 (1967). The Miller case i8 
significantly different from the case at bar because the 
architects were found guilty of negligence through their 
failure to properly put the stress factors on the plans. 
Furthermore, an Illinois statute imposed a duty on archi-
tects to require that contractors employ adequate and 
safe shoring methods in ''inherently complex, delicate 
and hazardous situations.'' A further distinction in 
Miller is that the Court found the removal of the prosce-
uium truss and end columns to be a matter which ... " 
was inherently complex, delicate and hazardous.'' In 
other words, the statute impressed a duty on the archi-
tects under such circumstances to insure that safe shor-
ing methods were employed due to the hazardous nature 
of the work. No such duty was imposed by statute upon 
Harold K. Beecher & Associates, nor did the architec-
tural firm make any errors or omissions in the plans and 
specifications with respect to the excavation. 
·we invite the Court's attention to the case of Gar-
den City Floral Company v. Hunt (cited above). This 
was a suit by the owner against the contractor and his 
surety for damage to a building caused by the negligence 
of the contractor in excavating in an improper manner, 
while constructing a new adjoining building for the 
owner. The defendants contended that the specifications 
contemplated the employment of an architect to give 
"full supervision" to the work and that since the archi-
tect as the owner's agent had not supervised the method 
of performing the excavation, the owner would not be 
10 
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entitled to recover from the defendants. The Court held 
that this "full supervision" as contemplated by the con-
tract did not include any supervision of the contractor's 
method of performing the work. The Court said at 255 
P. 2<l 357 of the report: 
''To say that he must supervise the method of 
doing the work before there is full supervision 
would place the architect in an entirely different 
role from that of an architect." 
'' ... As a matter of law the courts recognize that 
an architect merely supervises the results and 
does not dictate the methods when not controlled 
by the specifications.'' 
CONCLUSION 
The imposition on Harold K. Beecher & Associates, 
of a duty of continuous supervision of construction meth-
ods is neither contemplated by, nor given under the 
defendant architect's contract with the owner. The 
instant decision represents a radical departure from the 
traditional rule that architects are liable only for negli-
gent preparation of plans and specifications or negli-
gence through failure to require strict adherence to the 
plans and specifications. The departure is unwarranted 
and will cause ruinous results upon the construction in-
dustry and substantial additional expense to the public. 
The dissenting opinion in the Miller case sums up 
the consequences for the public and the industry if the 
rase for decision is affirmed: 
''If the duty of architects is expanded to require 
that they be on the job at all times and prescribe 
11 
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methods of construction or be held liable for the 
negligence of the contractor, they will reflect the 
added hurden in their supervision fees. All of this 
adds up to a11 additional and, I think, unnecessarv 
and unwarranted financial burden upon the publi.c 
without a commensurate benefit.'' 
''The huge construction industry in this country 
has functioned well without the imposition o.f 
liability on architects and engineers who design, 
but do not build, structures and other facilities. 
I see no justification for extending the common 
law to place liability on architects." 
THE ARCHITECTS HEREIN ARE NOT LIABLE 
AS THIRD PARTIES WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF WORKMEN COMPENSATION LAWS 
Section 25-1-62 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides 
inter alia: 
When any injury or death for which compensation is 
payable under this title shall have been caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another person not in tlic 
same employment, the injured employee, or in case of 
death his dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative 
may also have an action for damages against such third 
person. 
As is evident from a reading of section 35-1-62, 
Utah, like most states through its workmen's compensa-
tion laws, subjects third persons outside the employer-
employee relationship to common law tort liability, but 
such subjection to liability only applies to persons not 
in the sarne employment as the injured employee. 
12 
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In commenting upon the meaning of ''person not in 
the same employment'' this Court in Cook v. Peter 
Kiewit Construction Company ,15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P2d 
Gl6 (1963), said it "seems plainly designed to apply to 
strangers to the employment and not to co-workers 
jointly engaged in the same endeavor." In the subject 
case, plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries sustained 
while working on a diversion tunnel. Plaintiff was an 
employee of Coker Construction Company which had a 
contract with Kiewit to construct the tunnel. Under the 
contract arrangement Coker and Kiewit agreed to share 
profits and losses. Defendant contended that plaintiff 
was in its employ and therefore, it was immune from 
common law tort liability under the exclusive remedy 
provision of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. 
This court in reversing the lower court's refusal to 
grant defendant's motion for summary judgment held 
that plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, and as 
such, defendant was immune from common law tort 
liability. 
Though the court found a joint venture and stated 
that in a joint venture arrangement "the partnership 
entity should be regarded as the employing unit; and 
the employees of both companies as engaged in the same 
<>mployment,'' the real basis for decision seems to be 
that both employers were engaged in a common en-
deavor. Indeed, the dissenting opinion claimed that the 
majority placed little reliance on the formal elements of 
a joint venture in reaching their decision. 
13 
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Applying the rationale of Kiewit to the case for 
decision, it would appear that Harold K. Beecher & Asso-
siates, and the plaintiff were in the same employment 
and were co-workers jointly engaged in the same en-
deavor. The plaintiff's employer, Christiansen Brothers, 
Inc., and the defendant architects were all working for 
the joint authority towards a common goal - construc-
tion of the City-County complex. 
The defendant architects provided the plans and 
specifications for the project and furnished supervision 
to see that all materials used conformed to the grade and 
quality specified and to see that each completed phase of 
construction met specifications. Christiansen Brothers, 
Inc., plaintiff's employer, furnished the materials and the 
labor to place the materials. Under such circumstances 
can it be said that the architects were strangers to the 
employment of the plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The architects respectfully submit that they, under 
the doctrine of Kiewit, were co-workers with the plaintiff 
engaged in a common endeavor to construct a City-
County complex and therefore, are immune from com-
mon law tort liability under the exclusive remedy 
provision of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. 
ALLAN E. MECHAM, Esq. 
Amici Curiae 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-2516 
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